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Times Square: A Revisionist Lesson In City Building  
by Lynne B. Sagalyn 
 
Rapid comprehensive change in the physical pattern of a city is a minor revolution - as is 
the transformation of 42nd Street and Times Square. Two decades ago the agenda for change 
posed two big questions: Is it possible for cities to reshape what the market is likely to deliver in 
an area? Is large-scale redevelopment even a plausible political objective, especially when 
aggressive actions such as condemnation are deemed a necessary part of the strategy? 
In New York, where public officials operate in the shadow of Robert Moses, legendary 
master builder, and the specter of the failure of Westway, large-scale ambitions have been 
handicapped from the get-go. "Public Projects: Are They Viable in the City Anymore?" asked a 
seasoned New York Times reporter in 1985. The presumptive answer was no. Confidence in 
government performance in New York and elsewhere had been falling for years and had not yet 
hit its nadir. The transformation of Times Square reversed that trajectory, unexpectedly.  
The successful execution of the 42nd Street Development Project (42DP) rewrote the 
lesson plan on large-scale urban projects. It created a new story line -public-sector success- and 
definitively marked an era of city building in New York. 
From its beginning in 1980, the cleanup strategy for West 42nd Street grabbed center 
stage as a public initiative. Aggressively pushed forward by the mayor and governor, it reflected 
in both real and symbolic terms the city's agenda -and constant effort- to rebuild itself, 
economically as well as physically, and stem the continuous flight of its middle class to the 
suburbs. By the end of the decade, the effort had reached a stalemate, bogged down by litigation 
and entrapped in a downturn of the real estate cycle. The question of whether it was possible to 
execute as large a project as the 42DP seemed to have been answered in the negative. 
By the mid-1990s, however, opportunity born out of overbuilding, coincident with a shift 
in tastes favorable to cities, fused with a new entertainment-oriented vision for the street. As the 
use activity shifted from drug dealing, prostitution and pornography to legitimate theater, family 
entertainment and office employment, ironies of change defined the transformation-in symbolic 
as well as physical terms. 
The new Times Square is a “made dynamic”. It is not an accident; it is an invention. The 
20-year process was grinding, a highly politicized affair that would have been anathema to 
Moses, the power broker who defined the definitive command-and-control style of public 
development. 
The transformation of Times Square offers compelling testimony that it is still possible to 
execute ambitious city-building agendas - without Moses. It has recalibrated the scope of public 
possibility. It does so, however, only by adding substantive heft to the persuasive argument Jane 
Jacobs makes in her now-classic book, The Death and Life of American Cities. Jacobs maintains 
that big schemes for clearance and renewal could never work; only small-scale interventions and 
private investments can deliver the type of renewal that brings with it urban vitality. Though it 
violated most of the premises of what became a new planning orthodoxy -save for preserving the 
theaters- the tortured process of rebuilding West 42nd Street vividly demonstrates that if renewal 
calls for a significant amount of bulldozing, the vision must be consistent with the symbolic 
legacy of the place's past. 
Selectively chosen and skillfully executed large-scale projects might not be naturally 
doomed to failure. However, to view the cityscape once again, as did Moses, as a claylike 
assemblage of parts to be reshaped into a more efficient arrangement, would be to misread this 
message of renewal. 
